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Abstract 
Research has shown that a model statement elicits more information during an interview and 
that truth tellers and liars report a similar amount of extra information. We hypothesised that 
Veracity differences would arise if the total amount of information would be split up into 
core details and peripheral details. A total of 119 truth tellers and liars reported a stand-out 
event that they had experienced in the last two years. Truth tellers had actually experienced 
the event and liars made up a story. Half of the participants were given a model statement 
during the interview. After exposure to a model statement, truth tellers and liars reported a 
similar amount of extra core information, but liars reported significantly more peripheral 
information. The variable ‘details’ becomes an indicator of deceit in a model statement 
interview protocol as long as a distinction is made between core and peripheral details.  
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General audience summary 
 
 
Research has shown that a model statement, an example of a detailed report about an event 
unrelated to the topic of investigation, elicits more information during an interview and that 
truth tellers and liars report a similar amount of extra information. Interviewees typically 
underestimate how much information is required from them in an interview and the model 
raises the expectations amongst both truth tellers and liars about how much information they 
should provide. We tested the hypothesis that differences between truth tellers and liars 
would arise if the total amount of information was split into two categories: core details and 
peripheral details. A total of 119 truth tellers and liars reported a stand-out event that they had 
experienced in the last two years. Truth tellers had actually experienced the event and liars 
made up a story. Half of the participants were given a model statement during the interview. 
After exposure to a model statement, truth tellers and liars reported a similar amount of extra 
core information, but liars reported significantly more peripheral information. The variable 
‘details’ becomes an indicator of deceit in a model statement interview protocol as long as a 
distinction is made between core and peripheral details.  
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Using the Model Statement to Elicit Verbal Differences between Truth tellers and Liars: 
The Benefit of Examining Core and Peripheral Details 
 The verbal cues to deceit that liars show spontaneously are weak (DePaulo et al., 
2003). Researchers have therefore started to examine whether such cues can be elicited or 
enhanced through specific interview protocols (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij & Granhag, 
2012). One such protocol is the model statement technique. A model statement is an example 
of a detailed report about an event unrelated to the topic of investigation, usually presented in 
an audio-format at some time during an interview (Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & 
Fisher, 2015). Interviewees typically underestimate how much information is required from 
them (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). The theoretical underpinning of the detailed model 
statement is that it works as a social comparison (Cialdini, 2007; Festinger, 1954) raising the 
expectations amongst both truth tellers and liars about how much information they should 
provide (Ewens et al., 2016). As a result, both truth tellers and liars provide more details after 
being exposed to a model statement (Ewens et al., 2016; Leal et al., 2015). A model 
statement may work better than an instruction to ‘report all details’ because a model 
statement is an example, and examples are easier to follow than instructions. 
The model statement facilitated the elicitation of information in all eight deception studies 
published to date that we are aware of (Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij, 2014; Ewens et al., 2016; 
Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Lafferty, & Nahari, 2017; Kleinberg, van der Toolen, Vrij, Arntz, & 
Verschuere, 2018; Leal et al., 2015; Porter et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Vrij 
et al., 2017). However, the technique has generally been unsuccessful at enhancing the 
differences between truth tellers and liars regarding the amount of details they provide, as 
both groups tend to add a similar amount of detail when exposed to a model statement (but 
see Porter et al. [2017] for an exception). A possible explanation for this is that measuring 
total details alone does not take into account the differential strategies truth tellers and liars 
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employ. Differential strategies are taken into account when a distinction is made between 
core and peripheral details, as we examined in the current experiment.  
       Heuer and Reisberg (1990) defined core details as details that, if changed, can result 
in changes in the basic and most important part of the story; details that have no such impact 
are considered peripheral. This definition, although helpful, still requires a subjective 
judgment about the basic meaning to identify central and peripheral content, something that 
cannot be avoided when defining core and peripheral details (Yegiyan, & Lang, 2010). In the 
present study, we differentiated core events from peripheral events. If someone discusses 
attending an Adele concert, the core event is the actual concert, therefore all details that are 
about the actual concert are considered core details. Peripheral events concern the drinks in 
the pub before and after the concert and all details about these events are considered 
peripheral details. 
Both truth tellers and liars realise that providing a lot of information makes a sincere 
impression on observers (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Thus, 
a model statement will motivate both truth tellers and liars to provide more information. 
Truth tellers, who have actually experienced an event, will be able to provide more core and 
peripheral information, by employing a ‘tell it all strategy’ (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 
2007). For liars, providing more core information is difficult and risky. It is difficult because 
they have not actually experienced the event and thus have to make up information; and risky 
because the additional information may provide leads to investigators that the information 
they have given is untrue. Thus liars may avoid providing more core details, in an attempt to 
minimise the risk of presenting incriminating information (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; 
Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014), but may compensate for this by providing a lot of peripheral 
detail to satisfy the increased expectations created by the model statement regarding how 
much information they should provide. 
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In the current study truth tellers and liars gave an initial free recall which was then 
followed—or not followed—by a model statement. Hereafter the interviewees gave a second 
free recall. This second free recall was followed by the request to tell the story in reverse 
chronological order. Reverse order recall stimulates a truth teller to think about the event 
again but now from a different perspective. That often leads to additional information (Fisher 
& Geiselman, 1992). It may lead to even more additional information if truth tellers were 
initially exposed to a model statement. For two reasons it is unlikely that liars will report as 
much additional information as truth tellers. First, additional information results in less 
consistency (Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014), and liars often believe that it is 
important to be consistent in order to make a credible impression (Deeb et al., 2018; 
Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004). Second, a reverse order recall is mentally taxing, 
particularly for liars, whose cognitive resources have already been partially depleted by the 
cognitively demanding task of lying (Vrij et al., 2008). Experiencing substantial cognitive 
load while reporting in reverse order, may result in providing fewer details, regardless of the 
type of detail (core or peripheral).   
Hypotheses 
 In the second recall, more core and peripheral details will be reported in the model 
statement present than in the model statement absent condition (Hypothesis 1). Truth tellers 
will report more new core details than liars in the second recall, particularly in the model 
statement present condition (Hypothesis 2). Liars will report more new peripheral details than 
truth tellers in the second recall, particularly in the model statement present condition 
(Hypothesis 3). Liars will report fewer new core and peripheral details than truth tellers in the 
reverse order recall, particularly in the model statement present condition (Hypothesis 4). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
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A total of 120 participants were recruited, through the departmental participant pool and 
announcements posted in university buildings. Participants were invited to take part in a 
study that examined how good individuals are at telling the truth or lying about memorable 
events. Participants received a reward of either one course credit or £10 for taking part in the 
research, and their names were entered in a draw to win a prize of £50, £75, or £150. The 
sample included 93 females and 27 males, and their average age was 23.76 years (SD = 9.56). 
A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Model Statement: absent vs present) between-
subjects design was used. Participants were randomly allocated to the Veracity and Model 
Statement conditions with 30 participants in each cell. The dependent variables were initial 
total details, initial core details, initial peripheral details, new core details in second recall, 
new peripheral details in second recall, total new details in second recall, new core details in 
reverse order recall, new peripheral details in reverse order recall, and total new details in 
reverse order recall.  
Procedure 
Initial instructions. On arrival at the Psychology Department, all participants signed a 
consent form. Truth tellers were asked to think of a memorable event that happened to them 
in the past two years. The event should have been an out of the ordinary event that they (or 
others) do not experience daily. Truth tellers were given examples of such events (e.g., seeing 
a famous person when they were out for dinner, or going on a pheasant shoot). Liars and truth 
tellers were matched for memorable events. That is, liars were asked to lie about an event 
chosen by a truth teller and to pretend they have experienced that event. Matched liars and 
truth tellers were allocated to the same Model Statement condition.   
All participants were informed that they will be interviewed about the event and they will 
need to convince the interviewer that they are honest. To motivate participants, they were told 
that if they are convincing, their names will be entered in a draw to win £50, £75, or £150. 
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However, if they are not convincing, they will be asked to write a statement about the event 
and their names will not be entered in the draw. In reality, all participants were entered in the 
draw and nobody was asked to write a statement. Participants then honestly completed a pre-
interview questionnaire that asked about their background characteristics and their motivation 
to convince the interviewer (1= not at all to 7 = completely). 
Interviews. One of three interviewers, blind to the participants’ Veracity condition and to the 
study hypotheses, interviewed participants. In the first interview, all participants were asked 
to give an initial detailed free recall of the event. “Hello, I understand from my colleague that 
on <month and year >  you <event >. Could you please tell me in as much detail as possible 
everything about that event?” After this initial recall, in all conditions the interviewer left the 
room and returned after about fifteen seconds. The interviewer then introduced the request for 
the second recall in the model absent condition as follows: “Sorry but I am going to have to 
ask you again. Please tell me in as much detail as possible exactly what happened on <month 
and year > when you < event >?” In the model statement present condition, the request for 
the second recall was introduced as follows: “Please tell me in as much detail as possible 
exactly what happened on <month and year > when you <event > but this time before doing 
so I would like to play you a model statement to give you an idea of exactly how much detail 
I would like you to include in your response. OK?” 
 An audiotaped model statement was then played. It was 1.30 minutes long detailed 
account of someone attending a Formula 2 motor racing event (Leal et al., 2015). The 
account was a spontaneous, unscripted recall of an event truly experienced by the person. 
After the model statement, the interviewer continued as follows: “OK so remembering the 
amount of detail in the model statement, could you please tell me once more what happened 
on <month and year > when you <event>?”  
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 After the interviewees provided the second recall, the reverse order request was 
introduced as follows (in both the model statement absent and present conditions): “Thank 
you that was helpful, however, we know from research that asking individuals to recall their 
statement in reverse order helps with their memory of the event. Therefore, I would like you 
to recall the event, in reverse order, starting from when <event> ended and talk back to when 
<event> started.” After completing the reverse order recall, participants were asked to rate on 
a percentage scale (0% - 100%) the extent to which they were truthful in their recalls. Lastly, 
they were fully debriefed, rewarded, and thanked.  
Coding 
All interviews were audiotaped, transcribed and coded for details. Every noun, verb, 
adjective, and adverb was considered a single detail, but other details such as conjunctions, 
prepositions, and pronouns were not counted because they are not precise and thus not 
informative. For example, the sentence “I went to Heathrow airport, which is an international 
airport, to get my friend” included six details (went, Heathrow, international, airport, get, 
friend). A distinction was made between core and peripheral details. An example of core 
details is that of a participant who talked about taking part in his graduation ceremony: “The 
chancellor was introduced, and then he started giving out the certificates”. This statement 
described information that concerned the target event and included six core details 
(chancellor, introduced, then, started, giving, certificates). The same participant provided 
information that was peripheral or irrelevant to the target event when saying: “Two of my 
friends were staying in the hotel, so we went for breakfast”. This statement included six 
peripheral details (two, friends, staying, hotel, went, breakfast).  
 Details that were repeated in a single recall were coded only once unless they 
occurred in different contexts. An example of two different contexts is that provided by a 
participant who took a taxi to the airport and then took a taxi from the destination airport to 
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the hotel. Here, ‘taxi’ was coded twice, because the context of going to the airport differed 
from that of leaving the destination airport, and transportation means might have differed 
across the two contexts. In other instances, the participant could have taken a taxi to the 
airport but a train from the airport destination. Hence, the participant provided additional and 
useful information which merited coding the same detail twice. In the second and third 
recalls, new core and peripheral details were marked. Details mentioned in the second recall 
but not in the initial recall, and details mentioned only in the third reverse order recall were 
marked as new details.  
Two coders, blind to veracity and model statement conditions and experienced in 
coding deception data, coded the transcripts. They started by coding interviews from four 
participants. Disagreements between them were discussed and resolved. One coder coded all 
the transcripts, and the second coder coded 20 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability analyses 
revealed that the Intra-Class Correlation coefficients (ICC, single measures scores) were .84 
for core details, .64 for peripheral details, and .81 for new details. Although a .64 score is not 
high, inter-rater coefficients in the .60 range, or even lower, occur more often in verbal cues 
to deception research (Vrij, 2005; Vrij et al., 2017; 2018). 
Results 
 One participant had z-scores that were higher than 3.29 on core details in the initial 
recall, and new core and peripheral details in the second recall, and was thus considered an 
outlier (Field, 2009). None of the other participants had such high z-scores on these variables, 
so data from this participant was deleted. Hence, the final sample included 119 participants 
with 59 participants in the truth-teller and Model Statement conditions and 60 participants in 
the liar and No Model Statement conditions. 
Motivation and Truthfulness 
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 Truth tellers (M = 6.46, SD = .73, 95% CI [6.23, 6.69]) reported to be more motivated 
than liars (M = 5.98, SD = 1.02, 95% CI [5.76, 6.21]) to convince the interviewer of their 
truthfulness, F(1, 117) = 8.55, p = .004, d = .54, 95% CI [.17, .90]. However, the average 
mean score shows that also liars reported to be very motivated.  
 Truth tellers reported to have been overwhelmingly truthful (M = 96.78, SD = 13.44) 
whereas liars were not (M = 15.17, SD = 22.06). This difference was of course significant, 
F(1, 117) = 591.96, p < .001, d = 4.46, 95% CI [3.73,5.06]. That liars were to some extent 
truthful (15.17%) is not surprising and fits well with the notion that liars, where possible, try 
to embed their lies in truthful stories (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013). 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Three 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Model Statement: present vs absent) ANOVAs 
were carried out with total details, core details and peripheral details in the initial recall as 
dependent variables. We included the model statement as factor in this analysis, despite this 
factor being only introduced after the initial recall, to rule out any pre-existing differences in 
Veracity effects between Model Statement conditions prior to the model statement 
manipulation. Truth tellers reported more details than liars in the initial recall, see Table 1. 
This is a typical finding in deception research (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; Vrij, 2008). 
The results further revealed that truth tellers reported more core details than liars, whereas no 
significant difference emerged for peripheral details, see Table 1. The three Model Statement 
main effects were not significant, all F’s < 1.74, all p’s > .190, neither were the three 
Veracity X Model Statement interaction effects, all F’s < 0.65, all p’s > .421. This is not 
surprising because the model statement manipulation was introduced after the initial free 
recall.  
Hypotheses Testing 
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 A 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Model Statement: present vs absent) MANOVA was 
carried out with four dependent variables: the new core and peripheral details in the second 
recall and the new core and peripheral details in the reverse order recall. At a multivariate 
level the analysis revealed significant main effects for Veracity, F(4, 112) = 4.47, p = .002, 
ηp
2
 = .14 and Model Statement, F(4, 112) = 10.91, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .28. The Veracity X Model 
Statement interaction effect was not significant, F(4, 112) = 2.28, p = .065, ηp
2
 = .08.  
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 At a univariate level, two significant Veracity main effects occurred. Truth tellers 
provided more new core details in the second recall and in the reverse order recall than liars, 
see Table 1. At a univariate level, also two Model Statement effects occurred. In the Model 
Statement present condition, more new core details and more new peripheral details were 
reported in the second recall than in the Model Statement absent condition, see Table 2. This 
supports Hypothesis 1. 
 We predicted significant Veracity X Model Statement interaction effects for all four 
dependent variables. At a univariate level, for the second recall, a significant interaction 
effect emerged for new peripheral details, F(1, 115) = 4.82, p = .030, ηp
2
 = .04, but the 
interaction effect for new core details was not significant, F(1, 115) = 2.61, p = .109, ηp
2
 = 
.02. The interaction effects for reverse order recall were not significant for new core details, 
F(1, 115) = 1.18, p = .280, ηp
2
 = .01, or new peripheral details, F(1, 115) = 0.12, p = .735, ηp
2
 
= .001. Follow up tests were carried out for the model statement absent and present 
conditions separately. We not only examined Veracity effects for new peripheral details in 
the second recall (the significant interaction effect), but also for the core effects in the second 
and reverse order recalls. Since we obtained main Veracity effects for these two latter 
variables, we wanted to examine whether the two model statement conditions contributed to 
this main effect in an equal manner. In addition, relying on the significance of an interaction 
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effect is relying on a p-value. A p-value provides information about the statistical relevance 
but not about the practical importance of an effect (Du Prel, Hommel, Röhrig, & Blettner, 
2009; Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012). In this article, we are interested in the practical 
relevance of the Veracity effect and d-values are indicators of practical relevance (Fritz et al., 
2012). Comparing d-values between the two model statement conditions—what we did in the 
further analyses—is thus important for this article. See Deeb et al. (2017), Nahari and Ben-
Shakhar (2011), and Vrij et al. (2017) for a similar approach. The results are presented in 
Table 3.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
 In both the model statement absent and model statement present conditions of the 
second recall, truth tellers reported more new core details than liars. Also the effect sizes in 
both conditions were very similar (d’s are .71 vs .70), as shown in Table 3. This means that 
Hypothesis 2 has been rejected. Also in the second recall, liars reported more new peripheral 
details than truth tellers, but only in the model statement present condition. The effect size 
was also larger in the model statement present condition (d = .57) than in the model statement 
absent condition (d = .15). This supports Hypothesis 3. In the reverse order recall, truth tellers 
provided more new core details than liars, but only in the model statement present condition. 
However, effect sizes were comparable in the model statement present (d = .68) and model 
statement absent condition (d = .45). This rejects Hypothesis 4.  
 We finally carried out two 2 (Veracity: truth vs lie) X 2 (Model Statement: present vs 
absent) ANOVAs with total new details (new core details and new peripheral details 
combined) in the second recall and reverse order recall as dependent variables. Truth tellers 
reported more new details in both the second and reverse order recall, see Table 1. In 
addition, in the second recall, the interviewees reported more details in the model statement 
present than in the model statement absent condition, see Table 2. The interaction effects for 
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the new total details in the second recall, F(1, 115) = 0.54, p = .466, ηp
2
 = .005, and reverse 
order recall, F(1, 115) = 1.16, p = .284, ηp
2
 = .010, were not significant, but, for the reason 
described above, since we obtained significant Veracity main effects for these variables we 
examined the Veracity effects for the two model statement conditions separately, see Table 3.  
 Truth tellers reported more new details than liars in the second recall, but only in the 
model statement absent condition. However, the effect sizes between the model statement 
absent (d = .68) and model statement present conditions (d = .47) did not differ much. Truth 
tellers reported more new details than liars in the reverse order recall, but only in the model 
statement present condition. Again, the effect sizes between the model statement absent (d = 
.30) and model statement present conditions (d = .56) did not differ much. This means that 
truth tellers and liars responded similarly in terms of providing new details after being 
exposed to a model statement, supporting previous model statement research when total 
details were taken into account.  
Discussion 
 The present study replicated the ‘total details’ findings of most previous deception 
studies examining the model statement technique: i) Exposure to a model statement increased 
the amount of new details interviewees provided; ii) since truth tellers and liars provided a 
similar amount of new details, total details did not facilitate discrimination between them. 
A different pattern of results emerged when the variable ‘new details’ was split into 
two different variables: new core details and new peripheral details. The difference was found 
regarding peripheral details: Liars and truth tellers reported a similar amount of new 
peripheral details in the model statement absent condition but liars reported considerably 
more peripheral details than truth tellers in the model statement present condition. We thus 
can conclude that the model statement elicited one cue to deceit: new peripheral details. From 
a practical point of view, the findings thus suggest that investigators should listen to the 
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amount of new peripheral details interviewees report after exposure to a model statement. 
Those who add many new peripheral details -and thus seem to beat around the bush- may be 
lying.  
The practical value of using the model statement is further enhanced by its simplicity 
to use: All that is required is to ask an interviewee to listen to a detailed audiotaped statement 
about a topic unrelated to the topic under investigation. Finally, by examining new details an 
interviewee provides, we are introducing a within-subjects measurement, comparing two 
statements made by the same interviewee. It is not the ideal within-subjects comparison -
everyone adds peripheral details- but it is still better than a single statement analysis (Vrij, 
2016). If just amount of peripheral detail is considered -the only method of analysis in a 
single statement analysis- the problem arises that this will not only be affected by veracity but 
also by other factors including eloquence. Additional factors play a lesser role in within-
subjects comparisons, because it is no longer relevant how many peripheral details are 
influenced by being eloquent, but it becomes relevant how many additional peripheral details 
are included (more likely to be influenced by veracity).  
The finding that examining new peripheral details yielded better results in terms of 
distinguishing truth tellers from liars than examining total new details is not surprising, 
because the former takes into account the strategies liars use, whereas the latter does not. 
These differential strategies are triggered particularly when a model statement is used. In that 
condition, liars are encouraged to provide more information, which in their case is most likely 
peripheral information. Taking into account different strategies employed by liars in 
interviews to detect deception has proven to be beneficial before, see the Strategic Use of 
Evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014) and the Verifiability 
Approach (Nahari, 2018b; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014).  
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Core details did not become an indicator of deceit after introduction of the model 
statement. Unlike peripheral details, for core details a Veracity effect already existed in the 
initial interview, thus prior to introducing a model statement, which creates less opportunity 
for more enhanced veracity effects for core differences to arise in the further parts of the 
interview. Additionally, the number of core details provided by liars initially (8.10) was low 
relative to the number of core details provided by truth tellers initially (19.19). Therefore, 
liars had more opportunity to report additional details than for truth tellers; also what truth 
tellers can add is constrained by what they can remember, whereas liars do not have such 
memory constraints (Nahari, 2018a).  
Someone could argue that results would have represented better practical value if the 
model statement elicited differences between truth tellers and liars in presenting core details, 
as such details matter most in an interview. Although true, the present findings regarding core 
details still may facilitate lie detection. Listening to a model statement may make liars aware 
that they also need to add details about the core event to appear credible. The additional 
details liars provide about the core event, may subsequently be checked by investigators and 
indicate deceit. 
Truth tellers reported more additional core details in the reverse order recall than liars, 
and this replicates previous deception reverse order recall research (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & 
Fisher, 2012). The reverse order technique was initially developed for use with cooperative 
witnesses (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) but could be a useful tool to detect deception when 
applied appropriately. We discourage using the reverse order technique as a method to 
distinguish between cognitive load experienced by truth tellers and liars because both groups 
will experience increased cognitive load in a reverse order recall (Vrij & Fisher, 2016). 
Instead, we recommend that investigators pay attention to the amount of new information 
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provided in a reverse order recall, with truth tellers likely to report more additional 
information than liars.  
The model statement had no effect on the amount of detail elicited from the reverse 
order question. The absence of a model statement effect in the current study could have been 
caused by at least four factors. First, a lack of motivation. By the time the reverse order 
question was asked, truth tellers and liars had already reported their stories twice. Asking 
them to report it for a third time may have been too much. We found some indirect evidence 
for this assumption: The reverse order recalls were shorter than the initial and second recalls
1
. 
If the absence of an effect is caused by lack of motivation, real life interviews in which 
interviewees are probably more motivated may yield different results. A second explanation 
is that interviewees were saturated after two recalls and simply could not report much new 
information. In that scenario, real life interviews may produce similar findings as reported in 
the current article. A third explanation is that the effect of a model statement does not last 
long in an interview. In that respect, a better result may have been obtained if the interviewee 
was reminded again of the model statement when the reverse order question was asked (e.g., 
“Taking into account the amount of details you heard in the model statement, could you 
please …..”?). Finally, a reverse order recall is mentally taxing (Vrij et al., 2008), and 
perhaps too difficult to encourage long responses.  
In the model statement present condition, interviewees reported more new 
information than in the model statement absent condition. The ability of a model statement to 
elicit additional information has been well documented and is not the main finding of the 
current experiment. However, it is worth mentioning this effect because eliciting information 
is an important aim of an investigative interview (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014). A model 
statement can thus achieve two goals simultaneously: It elicits information and facilitates lie 
detection.  
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Table 1  
Total (New) Details, (New) Core Details, and (New) Peripheral Details in the Three Recalls as a Function of Veracity 
  
 Truth  Lie 
   F     p 
Cohen’s d 
M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI      d 95% CI 
Total number of details in initial recall 78.78 (44.22) 69.41, 87.73  52.63 (23.59) 43.64, 61.80 15.76 < .001 0.74 0.36, 1.10 
Core details in initial recall 65.85 (39.61) 57.60, 73.76  35.03 (19.38) 27.01, 43.02 28.54 < .001 0.99 0.60, 1.36 
Peripheral details in initial recall 12.93 (15.62) 08.76, 17.03  17.60 (16.43) 13.61, 21.80 02.68 .104 0.29 -0.07, 0.65 
New core details in second recall 39.69 (46.84) 32.43, 49.15  20.50 (22.30) 11.18, 28.38 12.13 .001 0.52 0.15, 0.88 
New peripheral details in second recall 06.54 (11.18) 03.46, 09.73  10.38 (14.20) 07.08, 13.30 02.59 .110 0.27 -0.09, 0.63 
New core details in reverse order recall 11.53 (14.83) 08.60, 14.63  04.92 (07.25) 01.95, 07.92 09.73 .002 0.57 0.19, 0.93 
New peripheral details in reverse order recall 03.86 (12.00) 01.39, 06.42  03.97 (06.62) 01.47, 06.46 00.00 .972 0.18 -0.35, 0.37 
Total new details in second recall 46.24 (49.37) 38.35, 56.43  30.88 (28.80) 21.33, 39.25 07.08 .009 0.38 0.01, 0.74 
Total new details in reverse order recall 15.39 (18.75) 09.36, 17.02  09.38 (10.71) 05.10, 12.70 05.90 .017 0.39 0.03, 0.75 
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Table 2  
Total New Details, New Core Details, and New Peripheral Details in the Second and Reverse Order Recalls as a Function of Model Statement  
 
 Model statement absent  Model statement present  
F p 
Cohen’s d 
 M (SD) 95% CI  M (SD) 95% CI  d 95% CI 
New core details in second recall 13.83 (16.52) 05.37, 21.93  46.47 (45.44) 38.89, 55.61  31.97 < .001 0.96 0.56, 1.32 
New peripheral details in second recall 04.95 (08.56) 01.82, 08.04  12.07 (15.41) 08.71, 14.99  09.63 .002 0.57 0.19, 0.93 
New core details in reverse order recall 07.77 (09.92) 04.71, 10.68  08.63 (13.97) 05.84, 11.87  00.30 .588 0.07 -0.29, 0.43 
New peripheral details in reverse order recall 03.52 (06.93) 01.04, 06.02  04.32 (11.81) 01.82, 06.85  00.20 .652 0.18 -0.28, 0.44 
Total new details in second recall 18.78 (19.16) 09.62, 27.54  58.54 (47.11) 50.05, 68.14  39.75 < .001 1.11 0.71, 1.48 
Total new details in reverse order recall 11.28 (12.30) 07.42, 15.02  12.95 (17.60) 09.36, 17.02  00.52 .471 0.11 -0.25, 0.47 
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Table 3  
Total New Details, New Core Details, and New Peripheral Details as a Function of Veracity and Model Statement  
 
 
 
  
 Truth  Lie 
      F     p 
Cohen’s d 
      M (SD)        95% CI      M (SD)       95% CI d 95% CI 
Model statement absent          
New core details in second recall 19.19 (19.67)  07.68, 30.71  08.10 (09.75) -03.81, 20.01 7.49 .008 0.71 0.17, 1.22 
New peripheral details in second recall 05.58 (10.51)  01.26, 09.91  04.28 (05.91) -00.20, 08.75 0.34 .559 0.15 -0.36, 0.66 
New core details in reverse order recall 09.87 (10.97)  05.72, 14.02  05.52 (08.25)  01.23, 09.81 2.99 .089 0.45 -0.07, 0.95 
New peripheral details in reverse order recall 03.19 (06.52) -00.27, 06.66  03.86 (07.43)  00.28, 07.44 0.14 .712 0.09 -0.41, 0.60 
Total new details in second recall 24.77 (22.39)  12.32, 37.23  12.38 (12.28) -00.50, 25.26 6.93 .011 0.68 0.15, 1.19 
Total new details in reverse order recall 13.06 (13.54)  07.78, 18.35  09.38 (10.71)  03.92, 14.84 1.35 .249 0.30 -0.21, 0.80 
Model statement present          
New core details in second recall 62.39 (57.16)  50.27, 74.51  32.10 (24.54)  20.58, 43.62 7.24 .009 0.70 0.16, 1.22 
New peripheral details in second recall 07.61 (11.99)  03.06, 12.16  16.10 (17.15) 11.77, 20.42 4.76 .033 0.57 0.04, 1.08 
New core details in reverse order recall 13.36 (18.22)  08.99, 17.72  04.35 (06.25)  00.20, 08.51 6.71 .012 0.68 0.14, 1.19 
New peripheral details in reverse order recall 04.61 (16.16)  00.96, 08.25  04.06 (05.88) 00.60, 07.53 0.03 .862 0.04 -0.46, 0.55 
Total new details in second recall 70.00 (59.71)  56.89, 83.11  48.19 (29.16) 35.74, 60.65 3.28 .076 0.47 -0.05, 0.98 
Total new details in reverse order recall 17.96 (23.20)  12.41, 23.52  08.42 (08.34) 03.14, 13.70 4.60 .036 0.56 0.03, 1.07 
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1
We carried out a within-subjects ANOVA with Detail as the only factor. We examined the number of details reported in the initial recall, the 
number of details reported in the second recall (new and repeated details combined), and the number of details reported in the reverse order 
recall (new and repeated details combined). The analysis showed a significant effect, F(2, 117) = 47.63, p < .001, ηp
2 
 = .29. Participants reported 
significantly fewer details in the reverse order recall (M = 47.13, SD = 33.64, 95% CI [41.02, 53.24]) than in the initial recall (M = 65.60, SD = 
37.57, 95% CI [58.77, 72.42]), F(1, 118) = 34.86, p < .001, d = .52, 95% CI [.25,.77], and than in the second recall (M = 79.86, SD = 51.22, 95% 
CI [70.56, 89.15]), F(1, 118) = 131.53, p < .001, d = .76, 95% CI [.48,1.01]. The interviewees also reported significantly more details in the 
second recall than in the initial recall, F(1, 118) = 12.72, p = .001, d = .32, 95% CI [-.06,.57]. 
